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KNOWLEDGE AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR
IN THE AUSTRIAN TRADITION OF BUSINESS CYCLES:
VON MISES VS. HAYEK
Agnès Festré
University of Nice - Sophia Antipolis
In this paper, we reconsider Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek’s theories of
business cycles in the light of their methodological approach. In the Wrst part, we
clarify Mises and Hayek’s methodological frameworks in order to provide a better
understanding of their programmatic approach of business cycles. The second part is
dedicated to their respective theoretical framework, as applied to capital, interest
and monetary theory. Finally, in the last part, we investigate the mechanisms at work
in Mises and Hayek’s explanations of the diVerent phases of the trade cycle, by
underlying the role played by knowledge and individual behaviour within market
adjustments.
1. Introduction
Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek both belong to the third gen-
eration of the Austrian School. The inXuence of the Austrian tradition
in the Weld of economics, starting with Carl Menger, is manifest in the
work of both authors. From the viewpoint of the history of economic
ideas, the two authors are associated with methodological individual-
ism and subjectivism, which are the strongly claimed foundations of
the Austrian approach of social sciences.
In the more restricted Weld of history of economic analysis, Mises
and Hayek are considered as the founders of the so-called Austrian
tradition of business cycles. This approach, which the origin can be
traced back to the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell, is characterised
by an integration of the Austrian theory of interest and capital together
with a non-quantitative monetary analysis.
The Wrst section of the paper aims at clarifying and contrasting
Mises and Hayek’s methodological frameworks in order to provide
a better understanding of their programmatic approach of business
cycles. A second section will be dedicated to their respective
theoretical framework, as applied to capital interest and monetary
theory. Likewise, their views will be contrasted in the light of their
methodological approach, with the aim of grasping the main
distinctive features of their respective business cycle analyses. At last,
we shall investigate Mises and Hayek’s explanations of the successive
stages of the trade cycle, by underlying the role played by knowledge
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and individual behaviour within the mechanisms of market adjust-
ment.
2. Methodological framework
It is unquestionable that Mises and Hayek’s views of economics grew
out of a methodological approach that is congenial to all Austrian
economists, and that emphasises individualism and subjectivism as
principles of analysis. However, as we shall develop, Mises and
Hayek’s views diVer as regards the epistemological foundations of
economic science.
2. 1. Apriorism vs. cognitivism
Mises’ work is strongly associated with the apriorist method. Accord-
ing to him, economics constitutes one of the various branches, to-
gether with sociology, psychology or even history, that form the cor-
pus of social sciences. He then emphasises the speciWcity of social sci-
ence as compared to other scientiWc disciplines such as physics or
natural sciences. Indeed, the distinctive feature of social sciences in
general, and of economics in particular, is that they deal with human
action. Mises’ endeavour is therefore to build a ‘general theory of hu-
man action’, which he refers as praxeology. Now, the speciWcity of so-
cial sciences requires an appropriate method of investigation. As Mises
indicates:
The science of human action that strives for universally valid knowledge is the
theoretical system whose hitherto best elaborated branch is economics. In all of its
branches this science is a priori, not empirical. Like logic and mathematics, it is not
derived from experience; it is prior to experience. It is, as it were, the logic of action
and deed.
(Mises, 1960 [1933], p. 37)
In other terms, Mises means that apriorism is the only available meth-
od that can provide the foundations for a ‘universally valid science of
human action’. Moreover, Mises’ apriorism is radical since it excludes
any ex ante reference to experience: it is, by nature, inherent to the
human mind. As Mises writes:
Following in the wake of Kant’s analyses, philosophers raised the question: How
can the human mind, by aprioristic thinking, deal with the reality of the external
world? As far as praxeology is concerned, the answer is obvious. Both, a priori
thinking and reasoning on the one hand and human action on the other, are man-
ifestations of the human mind. The logical structure of the human mind creates
the reality of action.
(Mises, 1978 [1962], p. 42)
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Such a position logically leads Mises to deny the issue of empirical
refutation. In The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, he argues
that the Popperian falsiWability criterion is not relevant to the theoret-
ical sciences of human action, where there are no experimentally es-
tablished facts. He adds that if apriorism makes praxeology ‘unscien-
tiWc’, the same may be said of mathematics (Mises, 1978 [1962], pp. 69-
70).
Let us now envisage Hayek’s methodological framework.
In The Counter-Revolution of Science, Hayek also contrasts natural and
social sciencesfrom the viewpoints of both their reliect and method1.
He writes:
While in (the social sciences) it is the attitudes of individuals which are the familiar
elements and by combination of which we try to reproduce the complex phenome-
na, the result of individual actions, which are much less known – a procedure which
often leads to the discovery of principles of structural coherence of the complex phe-
nomena which had not (and perhaps could not) be established by direct observation
– the physical sciences necessarily begin with the complex phenomena and work
backwards to infer the elements from which they are composed […] While the method
of the natural sciences is in this sense analytic, the method of the social sciences is
better described as compositive or synthetic. It is the so-called wholes, the groups of
elements which are structurally connected, which we learn to single out from the
totality of observed phenomena only as a result of our systematic Wtting together of
the elements with familiar properties, and which we build up or reconstruct from
the known properties of the elements.
(Hayek 1952a, pp. 38-39)
This passage is worth quoting at length since it reveals a dimension
that is absent in Mises’ approach. Hayek methodological indeed
argues that the facts studied by social sciences diVer from those of
physical sciences by being beliefs or opinions held by particular people
beliefs; which as such are our data, irrespective of whether they are
true or false, and which, moreover, we cannot directly observe in
the minds of people but which we can recognise from what they say
or do merely because we have ourselves a mind similar to theirs. As
he indicates:
1. In this book, Hayek also reXects on ‘scientism’, a term which he originally used to outline
the eVort by scientists and economists to imitate a rather dubious (and most likely false) con-
ception of the problems and explanatory strategies of the natural science. In his Nobel Memo-
rial Lecture, when referring to his 1942 article:”Scientism and the Study of Society”), Hayek
tells us :
“It seems to me that this failure of the economists to guide policy more successfully is closely
connected with their propensity to imitate as closely as possible the procedures of the brilliant-
ly successful physical sciences – an attempt which in our Weld may lead to outright error. It is
an approach which has come to be described as the ‘scientistic’ attitude – an attitude which, as
I deWned it some thirty years ago, ‘is decidedly unscientiWc in the true sense of the word, since
it involves a mechanical and uncritical application of habits of thought to Welds diVerent from
those in which they have been formed’”.
(Hayek, 1978 [1974], p. 23)
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[M]ost of the objects of social or human action are not ‘objective facts’ in the special
narrow sense in which the term is used in the Sciences and contrasted to ‘opinions’,
and they cannot at all be deWned in physical terms. So far as human actions are con-
cerned, things are what the acting people think they are.
(ibid., pp. 27-28)
In other terms, Hayek’s methodology of social sciences entails a cog-
nitivist element which is absent in Mises. More precisely, Hayek agrees
with Mises on the a priori validity of the “Pure Logic of Choice” ap-
plied to individual plans, but argues that praxeology cannot explain
interactive social processes without empirical assumptions concern-
ing the way according to which individuals acquire knowledge, form
expectations, and learn from their social experience. For though, such
empirical assumptions are to Hayek’s view necessary for the econo-
mist in order to show how market equilibrium occurs. It is only by
asserting the existence of a tendency toward equilibrium “that eco-
nomics ceases to be an exercise in pure logic and becomes an empiri-
cal science.” (Hayek 1949 [1937], p. 44).
Hayek’s standpoint implies a further distance from Mises’ apriorism
concerning the issue of empirical refutation. Hayek indeed accepts
according to which Karl Popper’s principle or the hallmark of any
scientiWc theory is its openness to empirical falsiWcation. However, as
we shall argue, Hayek’s emphasis on the fallacies of scientism suggest
in fact a deepening, rather than an erosion, of his recognition of the
extent to which economic theory is independent of – in fact a
prerequisite for – empirical economic observation.
2. 2. Individual, behaviour and uncertainty
As suggested above, Hayek and Mises diverge on methodology as re-
gards the relationship between the ‘individual’ and the ‘social’. Al-
though they both strongly support the individualistic approach, they
however do not share the same conception of subjectivism. Let us
investigate how the two authors deal with these issues.
To begin, Mises describes individualism as a principle of the
philosophical, praxeological, and historical analysis of human action means
the establishment of the facts that all actions can be traced back to individ-
uals and that no scientiWc method can succeed in determining how deWnite
external events, liable to a description by the methods of the natural
sciences, produce within the human mind deWnite ideas, value judgments,
and volitions. In this sense the individual that cannot be dissolved into
components is both the starting point and the ultimate given of all
endeavors to deal with human action” (Mises 1978 [1962], p. 81).
Mises’ conception of methodological individualism also implies a
particular treatment of determinism. On the one hand, Mises cannot
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conceive of any scientiWc method that permits to relate natural events
to the values or ideas of human beings – i.e., their subjective dimension.
This implies some ‘methodological dualism’:
[…] as long as we do not know how external facts – physical and physiological –
produce in a human mind deWnite thoughts and volitions resulting in concrete acts,
we have to face an insurmountable methodological dualism.
(Mises 1996 [1949], p. 20)
On the other hand, although it is reasonable to believe that the social
environment aVects the behaviour of individuals, it is not possible to
describe rigorously the mechanisms by which this inXuence proceeds.
Therefore, the only available procedure is to trace back the social en-
vironment to the action of the individuals that constitute it. In Mises
terms:
If we scrutinize the meaning of the various actions performed by individuals we
must necessarily learn everything about the actions of collective wholes. For a social
collective has no existence and reality outside of the individual members’ actions.
The life of a collective is lived in the actions of the individuals constituting its body.
There is no social collective conceivable, which is not operative in the actions of
some individuals. The reality of a social integer consists in its directing and releasing
deWnite actions on the part of individuals. Thus the way to a cognition of collective
wholes is through an analysis of the individuals’ actions.
(ibid., p. 42)
By contrast, Hayek does not believe that the social reality can be
grasped from the mere extrapolation from individual behaviour. First,
the subjective element, which characterises social sciences, renders
the comparison between two individuals behaviours and therefore,
its extension to the whole society, impossible. Second, he cannot
conceive of any general theory of human action regardless of its
cognitive aspects. For him, any action entails a problem of
interpretation, on the part of economic agents, of the information
available to them. In other terms, Hayek’s focus on social interaction
processes that result from, but also produce individual actions implies
a more complex approach of the relationship between the individual
and the society.
This sharp diVerence between Mises and Hayek is also reXected in
their respective conception of introspection. For both authors, the
recognition of the subjective component of social sciences necessarily
raises the question of their status. To put it diVerently, is it possible to
build a general ‘theory’ of the society? Or, is this endeavour a dead
end? For both authors, this diYculty can be overcome by introspection.
On one side, Mises writes:
What we know about our own actions and about those of other people is condi-
tioned by our familiarity with the category of action that we owe to a process of
self-examination and introspection as well as of understanding of other conduct.
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To question this insight is no less impossible than to question the fact that we are
alive.
(Mises 1978 [1962], pp. 72).
On the other, Hayek tells us that the nature of social phenomena is
such that they
are accessible to us only because we can understand what other people tell us and
can be understood only by interpreting other people’s intentions and plans. They are
not physical facts but the elements from which we may reproduce them are always
familiar categories of our own mind.
(Hayek 1949 [1943], p. 75).
To summarise, for Mises, self-observation as well as the under-
standing of other people’s actions are necessary for the theoreti-
cian. Besides, they do no conXict with one another since human
action is confused with a priori thinking and reasoning. On the
other hand, Hayek goes one step further by introducing the no-
tions of perception and interpretation so that introspection can
now help to explain the results of human action but not those of
human design.
The aforementioned diVerences in Mises and Hayek lead us to com-
ment on their respective views on knowledge and uncertainty.
The most accomplished work of Hayek about knowledge is found
in Sensory Order (1952). In this book, Hayek deals with the problem of
establishing the relation between ‘two orders’: the subjective, sensory,
perceptual, phenomenal, on the one hand, and of the objective,
scientiWc, physical, on the other. The main thesis consists in showing
that all attributes of mental experience can be explained by the place
in a system of connections of corresponding groups or patterns of
nerve-excitations. In other words, he wants to show that those mental
properties which we suppose ourselves to be acquainted with through
introspection and the observation of other people’s behaviour, deWne
certain structural or relational properties of the nervous system.
Therefore, the acquisition of knowledge through common mental
patterns provides the bridge between heterogeneous individual agents
and the kind of regularities we observe in the real word. These shared
mental structures thus constitute what Hayek calls the “mind”. As he
writes it:
What we call ‘mind’ is thus a particular order or set of events taking place in some
organism and in some manner related to, but not identical with, the [external] phys-
ical order of events in the environment. The problem which the existence of mental
phenomena raises is therefore how in a part of the physical order (namely an organ-
ism) a sub-system can be formed which in some sense … may be said to reXect some
features of the physical order as a whole, and which thereby enables the organism
which contains such a partial reproduction of the environmental order to behave
appropriately towards its surroundings. The problem arises as much from the fact
that the order of this sub-system is in some respects similar to, as from the fact that it
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is in other respects diVerent from the corresponding more comprehensive physical
order”.
(Hayek 1952b, p. 16)
This ‘connectionist’ conception of knowledge implies a particular treat-
ment of uncertainty. Far from being eliminated from Hayek’s frame-
work, uncertainty (or ignorance) is a crucial problem, which is due to
the deWciencies of the mechanisms transmitting new as well as
previously accumulated information.
By contrast, we have seen that, for Mises, individual behaviour is
the result of observation. There is no such process of classiWcation in
human mind that precedes action. Mises writes:
[The agent] satisWes what is of higher value, i.e., his more urgent wants, and leaves
unsatisWed what is of lower value, i.e., what is a less urgent want […] one must not
forget that the scale of values or wants manifests itself only in the reality of action.
These scales have no independent existence apart from the actual behavior of indi-
viduals. The only source from which our knowledge concerning these scales is de-
rived is the observation of a man’s action. Every action is always in perfect agree-
ment with the scale of values or wants because these scales are nothing but an instru-
ment for the interpretation of a man’s acting.
(Mises 1996 [1949], pp. 94-95)
In other terms, it is as if Mises had removed, by assumption, the
cognitive dimension of the knowledge acquisition process of indi-
vidual agents. Under these circumstances, the compositional princi-
ple, i.e., the principle connecting individual behaviour together with
its outcome at the market level, is rather postulated – or somehow
implicitly contained in a ‘strict’ rationality assumption – than dem-
onstrated2.
But more fundamentally, the Misean logic of ‘means and ends’ is
not concerned about how the mind of an agent works – a question
which Mises considers to be the concern of nemobiologists and not of
economist; rather, it is an interpretation, by the economist, of the
behaviour of agents, as it is observed, which is based on the nature of
the situation they face.
Finally, Mises’ stance at the issue of uncertainty can be interpreted
as follows: in compliance with the apriorist approach, uncertainty is
inherent to human action. Every action indeed implies a choice process
which would make no sense if the future, known by agents. In this
sense, action is always a risky speculation and there is no scientiWc
method that permits to treat uncertainty as such. One can illustrate
this idea by an example given by Mises. When referring to
entrepreneurial activity, he writes:
2. See Langlois (1991 [1985]), p. 120.
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Entrepreneurial judgment cannot be bought on the market. The entrepreneurial
idea that carries on and brings proWt is precisely that idea which did not occur to the
majority. It is not correct foresight as such that yield proWts, but foresight better than
that of the rest. The prize goes only to the dissenters, who do not let themselves
misled by the errors accepted by the multitude. What makes proWts emerge is the
provision for future needs for which others have neglected to make the adequate
provision.
(Mises 1996 [1949], p. 871)
In this statement, once again, the apriorist dimension, of human action
is obvious. To conclude, Mises’s abstract apriorism is substituted for
Hayek’s analysis of all the intermediary stages of the process of cognition.
3. Theoretical Framework
In the previous section we have contrasted Hayek and Mises’ meth-
odologies. Their respective methodological frameworks are not how-
ever to be considered separately from their theoretical  contributions.
As we shall develop now, the work of both Austrian authors is charac-
terized by the interplay of methodological and theoretical  elements,
whether the latter apply to the theory of capital or to the theory of
money and interest.
3. 1. Capital theory
Mises’ contribution to the theory of capital is worth pointing out for
two reasons. First, he developed a notion of capital that is truly sub-
jectivist and fully consistent with the subjective theory of value and
cost that was initiated by Menger. Second, while paying tribute to
Bohm-Bawerk’s seminal role in the development of the time-prefer-
ence theory, he sharply criticized the epistemological perspective from
which Bohm-Bawerk viewed time as entering the analysis3.
3. We shall wait until Human Action to Wnd Mises’ arguments against Bohm-Bawerk’s view
on time-preference. Before this, Mises adheres to the terminology of Bohm-Bawerk, albeit he
is fully satisWed with it. In the second edition of the Theory of Money and Credit, there is indeed
an intringuing footnote where Mises writes:
The fact that I have followed the terminology and method of attack of Böhm-Bawerk’s
theory of interest throughout this chapter does not imply that I am an adherent of that
theory or am able to disregard it as a satisfactory solution of the problem. But the present
work does not aVord scope for the exposition of my own views on the problem of interest;
that must be reserved for a special study, which I hope will appear in the not too distant
future. In such circumstances, I have had no alternative but to develop my argument on the
basis of Böhm-Bawerk’s theory. Bohm-Bawerk’s great achievement is the foundation of the
work of those who will do so in the future. He was the Wrst to make it possible systematically
to relate the problem of interest to that of the value of money.
(Mises 1981 [1924], p. 378 fn.)
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Mises’ theoretical developments on capital are found in Human Ac-
tion, except for one paper devoted to inconvertible capital in Epistemo-
logical Problems of Economics. In Human Action, like his Austrian prede-
cessors, Mises points out that economists “erred in classifying ‘capital’
as an independent factor of production.” (Mises 1996 [1949], p. 493).
He indicates:
The modern theory of value and prices is not based on the classiWcation of the factors
of production as land, capital, and labor. Its fundamental distinction is between goods
of higher and lower orders, between producers’ goods and consumers’ goods […]
The law controlling the determination of the prices of the factors of production is
the same with all classes and specimens of these factors.
(ibid., p. 640)
However, Mises’s notion of capital diVers from the ones of Bohm-
Bawerk and Hayek. Mises indeed views capital, as what modern ac-
counting calls the net worth4. He Wrst deWnes capital goods in order to
distinguish them from the broader notion of capital. He writes:
[Capital goods] are tools and half-Wnished products, or goods ready for consumption
that make it possible for man to substitute, without suVering want during the waiting
period, a more time-absorbing process for another absorbing a shorter time […] From
the notion of capital goods one must clearly distinguish the concept of capital. The
concept of capital is the fundamental concept of economic calculation, the foremost mental
tool of the conduct of aVairs in the market economy. Its correlative is the concept of income
[…] The whole complex of goods destined for acquisition is evaluated in money
terms, and this sum – the capital – is the starting point of economic calculation […]
That amount which can be consumed within a deWnite period without lowering the
capital is called income. If consumption exceeds the income available, the diVerence
is called capital consumption. If the income available is greater than the amount
consumed, the diVerence is called saving. Among the main tasks of economic
calculation are those of establishing the magnitudes of income, saving and capital
consumption.
(ibid., pp. 260-261)
By this statement, we are to understand that Mises rejects Bohm-
Bawerk’s notion of capital as real capital in order “to rehabilitate the
[Mengerian] abstract concept of capital as the money value of the
property devoted to acquisitive purposes against the Smithian
concept of the ‘produced means of production’.” (Hayek 1934a, p.
85). Furthermore, Mises deWnes capital, contrary to Bohm-Bawerk’s
conception in terms of an aggregate magnitude, as a purely private
concept.
On the role of time, Mises disapprove of would be an Bohm-Bawerk’s
view that time preference empirical regularity observed through casual
psychological observation. Instead, his methodological apriorist
approach leads him to see time preference as a “categorial element
4. See Gunning (1997).
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[…] operative in every instance of action” (ibid., p. 488)5. In addition,
Mises criticizes Bohm-Bawerk for not recognising that time should
enter analysis only in the ex ante sense6.
The role that time “plays in action consists entirely in the choices
acting man makes between periods of production of diVerent length.
The length of time expended in the past for the production of capital
goods available today does not count at all […] The ‘average period of
production’ is an empty concept.” (ibid., pp. 488-489). In other words,
Mises emphazises the teleological nature of time-preference as it is
expressed by forward-looking decision made by producers and
consumers.
Hayek starts playing attention to capital theory as early as 1934 in
his article: “On the Relationship Between Investment and Output”
(1934b). But his work in this Weld culminates in The Pure Theory of Capital,
in 1941, which as he himself indicates, is a systematic elaboration of
the capital theoretical foundations of his theory of industrial Xuctua-
tions. His contribution to capital theory is also characteristic of his
programmatic approach, which consists, in a Wrst step, of a historical
survey of previous relevant theories, with the objective of selecting
the elements that may be incorporated in his analysis of the problem
he wants to solve. He then proceeds by stating the methodological
principles that his theory has to obey (Birner 1999, p. 805). As early as
in 1928 in “Intertemporal Price Equilibrium and Movements in the
Value of Money”, Hayek focuses on the problem of intertemporal
coordination, which will provide the basis for his future work on capital
as well as the source of inspiration for many contributions in this area,
most notably for those of Hicks. He pursues this research programme
in Prices and Production, where his famous triangles provide a
convenient, albeit highly stylized, way of describing the modiWcations
in the intertemporal structure of capital implied by a change in indi-
viduals’ preferences or by monetary injections. The synthesis of earlier
formulations is contained in The Pure Theory of Capital, where Hayek
establishes the centrality of the capital problem in questions about the
market’s ability to coordinate economic activities over time.
Bohm-Bawerk’s inXuence is manifest in Hayek’s developments on
capital theory concerning the role of time. But Hayek is not satisWed
with Bohm-Bawerk treatment of capital as an aggregate of physical
commodities. Hayeks indeed claims that he has coupled the essential
element of time in the production process of the economy with the
inherent complexities of the capital structure. This implies that capital
is indisputably heterogeneous, precisely because it incorporates
historical time. In his Pure Theory of Capital, Hayek provides a detailed
5. See also Mises (1960 [1933]), p. 31.
6. See Kirzner (1990), p. 55.
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treatment of capital goods in terms of reproducibility, durability,
speciWcity, substitutability and complementarity. The composite struc-
ture of production, i.e., the nature of the relationships between various
capital goods, deWnes its degree of roundaboutness, i.e., the extent to
which the production process ties up resources over time.
This gives special signiWcance to the problem of intertemporal co-
ordination. In the strict sense of the term, intertemporal coordination
means that all production plans should be mutually compatible and
that they should be jointly consistent with resource availabilities. The
time component of capital involves some partial irreversibility in
producers’ choices, to the extent that the non-speciWc capital (i.e., raw
material) is committed to a speciWc use (i.e., a particular machine).
Discoordination may then arise, and usually does, when producers
cannot secure the additional capital needed to complete their plans.
The ensuing revision of their plans involves costs as well as capital
destruction, the extent of which reveals the degree of discoordination
of production processes.
To summarise, Hayek’s view on capital only applies to an economy
of production, where previous allocation of more and less speciWc cap-
ital goods constrains further accumulation of capital. By contrast, as
we have seen, Mises clearly distinguishes capital, which he conceives
as a monetary magnitude, from produced capital goods that reXect
individuals’ forward looking decisions.
3. 2. Monetary theory
Mises is one of the authors, together with Menger, who most contrib-
uted to the development of the Austrian theory of money. For in-
stance, Rothbard is laudatory towards Mises, so much that he will
write that “the Austrian theory of money virtually begins and ends
with Ludwig von Mises’ monumental Theory of Money and Credit
published in 1912" (Rothbard 1976 [1946], p. 160). However, Mises’ book
received little attention from his contemporaries7.
The ambition of Mises in his Theory is to integrate monetary analy-
sis with the Austrian theory of value. Mises tells us that the main task
of monetary theory is to determine the ‘objective exchange value of
money’, as seen in the market for commodities, i.e., in other words,
its purchasing power: “by ‘the objective exchange value of money’
we are accordingly to understand the possibility of obtaining a certain
7. Hayek notes, with some irony, that Mises’ book received a curious reviw by Keynes,
“who could not suppress a somewhat envious expression of admiration for the erudition and
philosophical breadth of the work, but who unfortunately, because, as he later explained, he
could not understand in German only what he knew already, did not learn anything from it”
(Hayek 1992 [1956], p. 131).
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quantity of other economic goods in exchange for a given quantity of
money.” (Mises 1981 [1924], p. 122). It should be pointed out that Mises’
notion of  ‘objective exchange value of money’, as he himself makes
clear, “has nothing to do except its name in common with the old idea
developed by the Classical School of a value in exchange inherent in
things themselves.” (ibid., p. 121). On the contrary, Mises’s conception
of money directly springs from his subjectivist approach. First, as he
puts it, the essential function og money is to facilitate the interexchange
of goods and services and that any other function of money (as a general
medium of payment or as a transmitter of value through time and space)
derives from the primary function as a medium of exchange (ibid., pp.
46-47). Second, Mises explains that the assumption that money has a
certain objective exchange value is logically required if one wants to
build a subjective theory of the value of money, otherwise the “gap
between satisfaction and ‘useless’ money [cannot] be bridged.” (ibid.,
p. 120). He then proceeds to deWne the price of money, like any other
price, as “determined in the last resort by the subjective valuations of
buyers and sellers.” (ibid.). This means that the subjective exchange
value of money is nothing but the anticipated use-value of the things
that are to be bought with it8.
Such a conception of the price of money conXicts with the then
prevailing quantity theory of money. Mises considers that the quantity
theory is unsatisfactory not because it is theoretically false but rather
because it is incomplete9. He writes:
[…] the only valid objection to [the quantity theory] is that it does not go back to the
ultimate determinants of prices. It is correct or incorrect, according to the content
given to the words demand and supply. It is correct, if account is taken of all the factors
that motivate people in buying and selling. It is incorrect, if supply and demand are
interpreted and compared in a merely quantitative sense.
(ibid., p. 151)
On the other hand, Mises Wnds weightier objection with regard to the
practical importance of the quantity theory:
It is said that the Xuctuating velocity of circulation of money, and the elasticity of
methods of payment made possible by the credit system and the progressive im-
provement of banking organization and technique, that is, the facility with which
methods of payment can be adjusted to expanded or contracted business, have made
the movement of prices as far as is possible independent of variations in the quantity
8. In this Mises anticipated Patinkin’s concept of ‘real balances’. See Moss (1976), who how-
ever notes that this idea is not consistent with Mises’ focus on forward-looking decisions by
heterogenous individuals. The agents indeed cannot decide the extent of their monetary needs
(i.e., the size of their cash balances) without knowing the whole array of market prices (Moss
1976, p. 22).
9. In fact, he does not develop a positive theoretical critique of the quantity theory. He
rather Wnds objections to its opponents who fail to account for the connection between the
quantity of money and the rate of interest (Mises 1981 [1924], p. 171).
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of money, especially since there exists no quantitative relation between money and
its substitutes, that is, between the stock of money and the volume of transactions
and payments.
(ibid., p. 173)
In other words, the elastic supply of money substitutes makes the
quantity theory irrelevant for monetary policy. Building on Menger,
Mises indeed developed an elaborate theory of money and credit
that can be described as an ‘inverted pyramid’, as Hayek will later
name it (Hayek 1935, p. 99). Beginning with commodity money, Mises
???? on by showing how banks can substitute claims to commodities
(e.g., gold certiWcates) for the commodities themselves. He calls these
claims “money substitutes” (Mises 1981 [1924], p. 50). Then, since
banks provide what he calls “circulation credit” through their sav-
ings-deposit-lending activities (ibid., p. 270), they can create a new
kind of money based on this credit, which he calls “credit money” or
“Wduciary media” (ibid., p. 61, p. 268) Fiduciary media on money
based on circulating credit that have the same appearance as money
substitutes10. It is indeed because of their identical appearance that
people accept them in exchange, in the same way that they do with
money substitutes. The diVerence between a money substitute and
the same denomination in credit money is entirely analytical. It is an
invention of the economist. From the user’s point of view there is
no diVerence.
As we shall see, the modiWcations in the quantity of money substi-
tutes give special signiWcance to the problem of time-preference in
Mises’ business cycle analysis. More precisely, variations of the quan-
tity of money (in the broad sense) provokes a redistribution of real
income and wealth: on the one hand, because people are apt to over-
look the variability of the exchange value of money; on the other hand,
because variations in the value of money do not aVect all economic
10. The issue of “Wduciary media” corresponds to the creation by banks of money substitutes
that are not covered by an equivalent and simultaneous quantity of goods or money proper.
Mises indeed distinguishes between money in the broader sense and money in the narrower
sense. The latter corresponds to money proper in the usual sense (including Wat money), while
the former comprises also money substitutes These substitutes are either money certiWcates or
Wduciary media depending on whether or not they are wholly covered by money in the narrower
sense and serve the same purpose as money proper since they are convertible and secure claims
to payments. They then add to the total quantity of money in circulation (Mises 1981 [1924], p.
155). In the following, interest is focused on Wduciary media, that is, banknotes and current
accounts which are not wholly covered by money in the narrower sense. This distinction ech-
oes the opposition made by Mises between the commodity credit and the circulation credit. The
former corresponds to “those credit transactions which are characterized by the fact that they
impose a sacriWce on that party who performs his part of the bargain before the other does – the
foregoing of immediate power of disposal over the exchanged good, or, if this version is pre-
ferred, the foregoing of immediate power of disposal over the surrendered good until the receipt
of that for which it is exchanged” (ibid., p. 297). By contrast, the second kind of credit transaction
is “characterized by the fact that in them the gain of the party who receives before he pays is
balanced by no sacriWce on the part of the other party” (ibid.).
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goods uniformly and simultaneously. The agents who, indeed, come
Wrst to the market to buy goods make the relatively largest gains in a
sequence scale the later they exercise the declining purchasing power
of their money.
Let us now envisage Hayek’s monetary theory.
Hayek’s monetary and trade-cycle theories are intertwined, a
circumstance that reXects the nature of his contribution to both fields.
In summary terms, Hayek’s monetary theory consists in integrating
money as a medium of exchange with the idea in price system arrived
as a communication network. His trade-cycle theory consists in
integrating monetary theory with capital theory, which emphasizing
a particular aspect of the price system, namely, its intertemporal
character. This programmatic approach leads him to reject Mises’
stance at monetary theory as regards the concept of ‘objective exchange
value of money’. He writes:
The Wicksell-Mises theory […] has only to be freed from any direct reference to a
purely imaginary ‘general money value’ in order to form the basis of a Trade Cycle
theory suYcing for a deductive explanation of all elements in the Trade Cycle.
(Hayek 1966 [1933], pp. 47-48)
Although in the above ??????? Hayek is unfair to Mises, what he wants
to underline is that his main concern is the determination of individual
prices11. Both in his Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle and in Prices
and Production, he argues against the then dominant focus, in the Weld
of monetary theory, i.e., the relationship between the quantity of
money and the general level of prices. In this critical task, Hayek follows
Mises, but in quite diVerent terms. Hayek indeed rejects the quantity
theory for being unable to deal analytically with the modiWcations that
the passage from a barter economy to a monetary one implies
regarding the determination of prices. As he writes:
Much theoretical work will have to be done before such a theoretical system can be
worked out in such detail that all the empirically observed characteristics of the Trade
Cycle can Wnd their explanation within its framework. Up to now, the monetary
theories have unduly narrowed the Weld of phenomena to be explained, by limiting
research to those monetary changes which Wnd their expression in changes in the
general value of money. Thus they are prevented from showing the deviations of a
money economy from a static economy in all their multiplicity.
(ibid., p. 131)
11. In Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, Hayek consents that “Professor Mises’ conception
of the intrinsic value of money extends the notion of ‘Xuctuations in money value’ far beyond
the limits of what this term is commonly understood to mean; and so he is in a position to
describe within the framework, or rather under the same name, of a theory of Xuctuations in
the value of money, all monetary inXuences on price formation.” (Hayek [1933], 1966, pp. 116-
117).
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This idea was already present in his 1928 article, where he discusses
the modification implied by different systems of exchange – from direct
to ?????? find of indirect exchange systems – on the determinations of
equilibrium ?????-????? prices. Hayek indeed writes:
It has already been shown that there must exist a deWnite ratio at which two goods
available at separate instants are exchanged. But is the existence of such a ratio neces-
sary if the exchange does not take place directly, but is split up into two steps: the
acquisition of the means of exchange by surrendering one good at the Wrst point in
time, and the acquisition of another good by surrendering the means of exchange at
a later point?
(Hayek 1984 [1928], p. 82)
Hayek then proceeds to comment on the concept of ‘general value of
money’. According to him, this concept is inaccurate. But more im-
portantly, its use implies the inaccurate denial of the fact that, “within
an equilibrium system extended through time, temporal diVerences
in the value of money may exist, in the same way that Mises disputes
the possibility of spatial diVerences in the value of money.” (Hayek
1984 [1928], p. 90). Now, indirect exchange induces successive money
prices, because when the quantity of money is increased, the new
money is injected in some particular way, which temporarily distorts
relative prices  and therefore, communicate false information about
consumer preferences and resource availability.
The main objection Hayek this makes to the quantity theory relates
to its inability to account for the local and temporal changes in relative
individual prices, which are the only ones on which agents base their
economic decisions12. In this perspective, the following passage from
Prices and Production is worth quoting at length:
What I complain of is not only that [the quantity] theory in its various forms has
unduly usurped the central place in monetary theory, but that the point of view
from which it springs is a positive hindrance to further progress. Not the least harmful
eVect oV this particular theory is the present isolation of the theory of money from
the main body of general economic theory.
For so long as we use diVerent methods for the explanation of values as they are
supposed to exist irrespective of any inXuence of money, and for the explanation of
that inXuence on prices, it can never be otherwise. Yet we are doing less than this if
we try to establish direct causal connections between the total quantity of money, the
general level of all prices and, perhaps, also the total amount of production. For none
of these magnitudes as such ever exerts an inXuence on the decisions of individuals;
yet it is on the assumption of a knowledge of the decisions of individuals that the
main proposition of non-monetary economic theory are based. It is to this ‘individu-
alistic’ method that we owe whatever understanding of economic phenomena we
possess; that the modern ‘subjective’ theory has advanced beyond the classical school
in its consistent use is probably its main advantage over their teaching.
(Hayek 1935 [1931], pp. 3-4)
12. For a systematic presentation of Hayek’s opposition to the quantity theory, see Arena
(1999).
28 Agnès Festré
To sum up, Mises and Hayek both reject the quantity theory on the
ground of their scepticism toward aggregates. But Mises insists on its
practical uselessness owing to the impossibility to establish statistical
regularities between the volume of money substitutes and the money
base. By contrast, Hayek focuses on the inadequacies of the method-
ological foundations of the quantity theory for dialing with individual
prices’ determination.
3. 3. The rates of interest
Mises’ conception of the rate of interest has changed over time along
with his treatment of capital. In his early Theory of Money and Credit,
Mises’ stance at the rate of interest directly originates from Wicksell.
He likewise distinguishes between the monetary (loan) rate of interest
and the natural rate of interest. The former is determined on the loan
market. But the quasi-inWnite elasticity of the supply of Wduciary media
by banks makes it possible even an extremely low loan rate of interest
(Mises 1981 [1924], p. 346). As for the natural rate of interest it is deWned
in Böhm-Bawerkian terms as:
[T]he level of productivity of that lengthening of the period of production which is
just justiWable economically and of that additional lengthening of the period of pro-
duction which is just not justiWable; for the interest on the unit of capital upon whose
aid the lengthening depends must always amount to less than the marginal return of
the justiWable lengthening. The period of production which is thus deWned must be
of such a length that exactly the whole available subsistence fund is necessary on the
one hand and suYcient on the other for paying the wages of the laborers throughout
the duration of the productive process.
(ibid., p. 399)
Mises’ monetary analysis however implies that variations in the ra-
tio of exchange between present goods and goods of higher orders
are not diVerent phenomena from the variations in the objective
exchange value of money (ibid., p. 388). Now, the phenomenon of
interest is derived from the variations in the ratio of exchange
between present and future goods. Under these circumstances, any
modiWcation in the supply of Wduciary media translates into a change
in the rate of interest. Mises’ analysis of the connection between
variations in the objective exchange value of money and variations
in the rate of interest is to be interpreted in the following manner:
with given demand, an increase in the supply of money in the broader
sense brings out excess cash balances, which implies a market
pressure towards higher goods’ prices. But money does not Xow into
the economic circuit uniformly and instantaneously. It goes in the
Wrst place towards intermediate goods. Hence, the ?????? rise in the
price of consumption goods, i.e., the fall in the objective exchange
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value of money, is at Wrst all of a piece with the rise in the relative
price of production goods over consumption goods, i.e., a diminution
of the rate of interest. The rate of interest Mises refers to is in fact
the ‘interest on capital’: since there is neither Wxed capital nor explicit
account of the bond market, the capital market is included, and
confused with the money market13. In his later Human Action, Mises
uses the term ‘originary’ rate of interest, defined as the discount of
future as against present goods. Now, the phenomenon of interest
directly relates to time preference, with no more reference to Bohm-
Bawerk’s natural rate of interest. As he writes:
Time preference is a category inherent in every human action. Time preference
manifests itself in the phenomenon of originary interest, i.e., the discount of future
as against present goods [...] Originary interest is the ratio of the value assigned to
want-satisfaction in the immediate future and the value assigned to want-satisfaction
in remote periods of the future. It manifests itself in the market economy in the
discount of future goods as against present goods. It is a ratio of commodity prices,
not a price in itself. There prevails a tendency toward the equalization of this ratio
for all commodities. In the imaginary construction of the evenly rotating economy
the rate of originary interest is the same for all commodities.
(Mises 1996 [1949], pp. 524-526)
By this statement, we are to understand that interest would emerge
even in a pure exchange economy without production.
Thus, since production takes time, the market prices of the factors
of production (which tend to reXect the market prices of the consum-
er goods they produce) are themselves subjected to time preference.
Thus, in a production economy, the market generates the interest
defined as the excess value of produced goods over the appropriately
discounted values of the relevant factors of production14.
Hayek’s position with respect to interest also grew out of the work of
Wicksell. As is well known, in Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle and in
Prices and Production, Hayek distinguishes between two rates, the mon-
etary rate of interest on one hand, and the equilibrium rate on the other.
In some contrast to Mises, Hayek considers that the level of the
monetary rate of interest, which is determined in the loan market, is
limited by banking liquidity considerations. As he puts it:
The lifetime of [the] pyramid of credit is limited to that of the Wrst credit granted,
save in the case (which can be assumed as long as there are no withdrawals from
deposits) where it is immediately replaced by a fresh credit. If, however, deposits
unexpectedly diminish at any part of the banking system, the process will be re-
versed, and the original diminution of deposits will occasion a contraction of credit
correspondingly exceeding the amount withdrawn.
(Hayek 1966 [1933], p. 161)
13. See Bellofiore (1998), p. 542.
14. See Kirzner (1990 [1976]), p. 95.
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On the other hand, the equilibrium rate of interest is the level of the
market rate of interest that would be such as to make the in natura
demand for capital, i.e., investment, coincide with the in natura sup-
ply of capital, i.e., savings. Now, in a monetary economy, the current
rate of interest has no reason to coincide with the ‘imaginary’
equilibrium rate of a static direct exchange economy. As Hayek
notes:
In the economic system of to-day, interest does not exist in the form in which it is
presented by pure economic theory […] The process of interest Wxation, which is at
the basis of pure theory, never in fact follows the same source in a modern credit
economy; for in such an economy the supply of, and the demand for, savings never
directly confront each other.
(ibid., p. 200)
In other terms, in a money economy, the monetary rate may diVer
from the equilibrium one, because demand and supply do not meet in
their natural form, but in the form of money “the quantity of which
available for capital purposes may be arbitrarily changed by the banks”
(Hayek 1935 [1931], p. 23).
Having the time consuming process of production in mind, the equi-
librium rate of interest is therefore that particular rate which
corresponds to the diVerence between the set of the prices of Wnished
goods and the set of the prices of means of production and which
permits to save from current consumption and make available for in-
vestment, as much as is needed for the maintenance of that structure
of production (Hayek 1966 [1933], pp. 212-213).
By the same then, Hayek’s exercises  in Prices and Production consist
in determining the degree of roundaboutness of the structure of
production that is consistent with consumers’ time preferences. So, a
fall in the market rate of interest reXecting an increased willingness to
forego present goods for future goods creates incentives for engaging
in production processes of greater degree of roundaboutness (Hayek
1935 [1931], pp. 50-53). In other terms, Hayek assumes that the
equilibrium rate of interest reXects consumers’ time preferences. If
the latter are modiWed in such a way that  consumers make the decision
to forgo present for future consumption, i.e., to save more, the average
period is lengthened to such an extent that the increased amount of
capital can remain invested until the output of the single consumption
good is obtained.
To conclude, for Mises interest is connected to changes in both the
aggregate price level and the exchange ratio between present and future
goods. In fact, as we have seen, modiWcations in the objective exchange
value of money necessarily translate in a variation of interest, to the
extent that money does not Xow uniformly and instantaneously within
the economic circuit. However, in Human Action, when Mises switches
from Böhm-Bawerk’s notion of natural rate of interest to the concept
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of originary rate of interest reXecting time preference, it is not clear
whether there should exist a deWnite equilibrium level of the market
rate of interest. We shall return to this point later on.
On the other hand, Hayek focuses on the variations in the exchange
ratio between consumption goods and production goods that sys-
tematically arises from a change in the volume of money. In other
words, a change in the total quantity of money in circulation implies
the formation of prices or rates of interest which diVer from those
one would Wnd associated with a barter economy. Moreover, the
new intertemporal price structure (including the rates of interest)
which follows a change in the volume of money conveys wrong
information.
Now that we have set out the methodological and theoretical
frameworks of Mises and Hayek, we can proceed to the examination
of their respective approaches of business cycles.
4. Origin, propagation and reversal of the cycle
4. 1. Origin
We have seen, in his Theory that Mises provides an analysis of the
connection between variations in the objective exchange value of
money and variations in the rate of interest. He then comes on by
distinguishing between two kinds of inXuence on the rate of interest
that may result from an increase of the issue of Wduciary media by
banks. The Wrst one is indirect and permanent because it operates
through the displacements in the social distribution of income and
wealth, which occur as a consequence of variations in the objective
exchange value of money15. But whether the increase of the stock of
money in the broader sense causes the interest rate to fall (or to raise)
depends on whether the new distribution of income and property is
more (or less) favourable to the accumulation of capital. In certain
circumstances, for instance, when the redistribution of wealth
following an increase of Wduciary media leads to increased saving and
to a reduction of the standard of living, i.e., to an increase in the national
subsistence fund, it is possible for even the natural rate of interest to
diminish (Mises 1981 [1924], p. 400). The second kind of inXuence is
directly related to the business of banking. More exactly, when issuing
new Wduciary media, commercial banks cause the interest rate to fall.
Let us quote Mises on this point:
15. In fact, the eVect on the rate of interest is as permanent as the Xuctuations in the objective
exchange value of money (Mises 1981 [1924], p. 384).
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The new Wduciary media coming on the loan market have also a direct eVect on the
rate of interest. They are an additional supply of present goods and consequently
they tend to cause the rate of interest to fall.
(ibid., p. 391)
But, although Mises recognises that both the direction and the intensity
of the indirect eVect following the displacements in the social distribution
of income and property, are not easy to determine, he nevertheless as-
sumes that “the increase in the supply of Wduciary media in the mar-
ket in which present goods are exchanged for future goods at Wrst
exerts a stronger inXuence than the displacement of the social distri-
bution which occurs as a consequence of it.” (ibid., p. 391).
Starting from an equilibrium position where the loan rate of interest
is identical to the natural rate of interest, the cycle is therefore initiated
by an exogenous shock: the issuing by banks of new Wduciary media,
which causes the loan rate of interest to fall below the natural rate.
In Monetary Stabilization and Cyclical Policy (1928) as well as in Hu-
man Action, Mises describes the origin of expansion in similar terms.
Now, the cycle starts with the release of an additional supply credit
permitted by the issue of Wduciary media, i.e., bank notes without
gold backing or current accounts, which are not entirely backed by
gold reserves. This produces a decrease in the rate of interest, and
hence, stimulates economic activity. Some new projects, which would
not have been considered as proWtable if the rate of interest had not
been inXuenced by the manipulation of banks, are now initiated.
In Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, Hayek argues against exoge-
nous explanations such as Mises’ one, stating that:
A theory which has to call upon the deus ex machina of a false step by bankers, in
order to reach its conclusions is, perhaps, inevitably suspect. Yet Professor Mises
himself – who is certainly to be regarded as the most respected and consistent expo-
nent of the monetary theory of the Trade Cycle in Germany – has, in his latest work,
aVorded ample justiWcation for this view of his theory by attributing the periodic
recurrence of the Trade Cycle to the general tendency of Central Banks to depress
the money rate of interest below the natural rate.
(Hayek 1966 [1933], p. 145)
By contrast, Hayek calls for an endogenous theory of business cycles
that would permit a consistent explanation of the periodic recurrence
of cycles. He writes:
By disregarding those divergences between the natural and monetary rate of interest
which arise automatically in the course of economic development, and by emphasiz-
ing those caused by an artiWcial lowering of the money rate, the Monetary Theory of
the Trade Cycle deprives itself of one of its strongest arguments; namely, the fact
that the process which it describes must always recur under the existing credit
organization, and that it thus represents a tendency inherent in the economic sys-
tem, and is in the fullest sense of the word an endogenous theory.
(ibid., pp. 146-147)
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Therefore, for Hayek, the origin of the cycle lies in a divergence be-
tween the money rate of interest and the ‘equilibrium’ one. Whether
the initial disequilibrium is caused by a monetary or by a real change
????? not really matter. Hayek indeed consents that the level of the rate
of interest on loans needs not to be lowered by deliberate intervention
from the monetary authorities. As he indicates:
The same eVect can be obviously produced by an improvement in the expectations
of proWt or by a diminution in the rate of saving, which may drive the ‘natural rate’
(at which the demand for and the supply of savings are equal) above its previous
level; while the banks refrain from raising their rate of interest to a proportionate
extent, but continue to lend at the previous rate, and thus enable a greater demand
for loans to be satisWed than would be possible by the exclusive use of the available
supply of ‘savings’.
(ibid., p. 147)
Various circumstances causing a divergence between the two rates
are indeed envisaged by Hayek. For instance, he refers to “changes
in the relations of costs and selling prices” (ibid., p. 129) or to “shifts
in the distribution of incomes” (ibid.), which he considers as phe-
nomena resulting indirectly from “monetary inXuences.” (ibid.,
p. 128).
By contrast, in Prices and Production, Hayek’s focus has shifted to the
“successive changes in the real structure of production which
constitutes those Xuctuations”16. He now regards the “case of an
increase of money in the form of credits granted to producers.” (Hayek
1935 [1931], p. 54) as the starting point of the analysis and sees in the
‘deliberate’ decision-making by the monetary authorities the ultimate
cause of the cycle (ibid., p. 85).
Let us now investigate how the expansion in the cycle ?????? Mises and
Hayek’s explanations.
4. 2. Propagation
In Mises’ analysis of the trade cycle, as described in his Theory, the
reduction of the interest on loans initiated by banks enables and oblig-
es entrepreneurs to enter upon longer processes of production.
Assuming decreasing returns on capital, the additional funds provided
by banks are invested in longer roundabout processes of production
as long as they still pay the entrepreneurs. Thus, the decrease of the
rate of interest on capital is necessarily followed by a lengthening of
16. See his Introduction to the English translation of Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle,
1966, p. 17.
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the ‘average’ period of production17. However, this lengthening of
the ‘average’ period of production is only practicable when the means
of subsistence have increased suYciently to support the workers and
entrepreneurs during the whole period of production. If this is not
the case, then, the trend towards increased productive activity will
prove to be unsustainable. Mises writes that “a time must necessarily
come when the means of subsistence available for consumption are
all used up although the capital goods employed in production have
not yet been transformed into consumption goods.” (Mises 1981
[1924], p. 400). Assuming as a starting-point a situation of general
stationary equilibrium where all factors of production are already
fully employed, the implementation of more roundabout processes
of production will cause the price of production goods (including
labor) to rise since there has been no increase of intermediate
products. However, Mises supposes that the pressure on produc-
tion goods is greater than that on consumption goods, since the prices
of the latter, although they rise, do it in a moderate degree, namely,
“only insofar as they are raised by the rise in wages”18. (ibid., p. 401).
Therefore, it turns out that the tendency toward a fall in the rate of
interest on loans that originates in the policy of banks is at Wrst
strengthened. In other words, the objective exchange value of money
does not fall enough so as to induce the adequate adjustment
(increase) of the loan rate of interest.
In Monetary Stabilization and Cyclical Policy (1928), whose analysis is
all contained in Human Action(1940), as we shall develop, Mises switches
his emphasis on the divergence between the loan rate of interest and
the natural rate for the analysis of the mechanism of the price premi-
um. This change also reveals his endeavour to account for individu-
als’ price expectations.
In the Theory of Money and Credit, Mises indeed implicitly assumes
that the loan rate of interest determines the rate of interest, i.e., in his
own terms, the rate of exchange between present goods and future
goods. Conversely, every change in the price ratio between produc-
tion goods and consumption goods impinges on the loan market, which
automatically adjusts, with some lag, to monetary changes.
In Human Action, things become diVerent. First, Mises focused on
the rate of originary interest, which he deWnes as the ratio between
the prices of present and future goods. But this rate can coincide with
17. As we have seen, in his Theory of Money and Credit, Mises follows Bohm-Bawerk’s termi-
nology, although he is not fully satisWed with it.
18. Hayek gives a similar account of the movement of relative prices during the cycle. As
stressed by Hicks (1967), some delay (of consumption relative to wages, or in the wage rise)
must be supposed for the Hayek story to make sense. As for Mises, see Bellofiore (1998, note
53), who supports Mises’ claim, i.e., a delay in wages.
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the rate of interest on loans only in the imaginary construction of the
evenly rotating economy. In this case, “we may call this rate the neutral
rate of interest.” (Mises 1996 [1949], p. 538). In every situation where
the ‘money relation’ i.e., the ratio between the demand for and the
supply of money for cash holdings is changed, the resulting
modiWcations in the wealth and the income of individuals alter the
height of originary interest. Thus, the driving force of money has the
power to bring about lasting changes in the Wnal rate of originary
interest (ibid.). By this, we are to understand that 1. there cannot be
any conceivable uniform rate of originary interest in a changing
economy; 2. there is no more permanence in the rate of originary
interest than in prices and wage rates:
In the changing economy, the rate of interest can never be neutral. In the changing
economy, there is no uniform rate of originary interest; there only prevails a tenden-
cy toward the establishment of such uniformity. Before the Wnal state of originary
interest is attained, new changes in the data emerge which divert anew the move-
ment of interest rates toward a new Wnal state. Where everything is unceasingly in
Xux, no neutral rate of interest can be established.
(ibid., p. 542)
Furthermore, the loan rate of interest is not any longer considered as
determining the current rate of interest as it is manifested in the ratio of
the prices of present over future goods Mises indicates that:
the loan rate does not determine the rate of interest. It adjusts the rate of interest on
loans to the rate of originary interest as manifested in the discount of future goods.
(ibid., p. 527)
What now plays the same role as the loan rate of interest in the Theory
is the ‘gross rate of interest’, as it already appeared in his 1936 article:
“The ‘Austrian’ Theory of the Trade Cycle”. This rate should not be
confused with the originary rate of interest or the rate of interest on
capital. There are, indeed, as many gross rate of interest as there are
individual debt contracts, so that gross market rates are not pure
interest rates (ibid., p. 539). In other terms, the gross rate of interest
incorporates the uncertainty component of both parts on the contract.
On one hand, the lender is always faced with the possibility of losing
part or the whole of the principal lent. On the other hand, the owner
lodges part of his fortune as collateral (ibid., p. 540). Their initial
appraisal of both these dangers determines their conduct in the
bargaining about the terms of the contract.
Moreover, the gross market rate of interest also incorporates a price
premium, i.e., a negative or positive addedum to the net rate of interest
in order to account for individuals’ price expectations. However, as
Mises points out, the price premium can never offset the changes in
the money relation because its appearance always occur after those
changes and can never precede them (ibid., p. 544). Furthermore, the
36 Agnès Festré
price premium always lags behind the initial change in the supply of
money since it can only react to “the necessary later occurring eVects
of these changes upon the price structure.” (ibid., p. 545). This point is
worth emphasising since it permits a better understanding of the
sequence of the cycle.
The unfolding of the cycle can then be summed up as follows.
Similarly to Mises’ description in the Theory, the movement begins
with a credit expansion by banks, which induces the gross rate of
interest to fall. At this stage, assuming as a starting-point a Wctitious
position of equilibrium, no positive price premium arises. The price
premium can indeed appear only after the additional supply of money
(in the broader sense) has run its eVects on the prices of commodities
and services. Mises writes :
[…] if such changes in the money relation aVect Wrst the loan market, they bring
about just the opposite changes in the conWguration of the gross market rates of
interest. While a positive or negative price premium would be required to adjust
the market rates of interest to the changes in the money relation, gross interest
rates are in fact dropping or rising […] [The operation of the instrumentality of the
price premium] begins too late, it lags behind the changes in purchasing power
[…].
(Mises 1996 [1949], p. 548)
Then about the investment ????????, the drop in the gross market rate
of interest aVects the entrepreneur’s calculation the probability of
success of projects considered: “along with the prices of the material
of productions, wages rates, and the anticipated future prices of the
products, the gross rates of interest show him what investments can
be made under the given state of the ratio in the public’s valuation of
future goods as against present goods” (ibid., p. 552). But now that the
decrease in the gross rate of interest has altered the entrepreneurs’
calculations, now some projects appear to be proWtable. They then
embark upon their realisation. A boom begins. Then, the problem
arises as to how the gross market rate can adjust the originary rate of
interest, notwithstanding that the latter, although being independent
of the supply of money, can however be indirectly aVected by the
changes in the money relation. As credit expansion continues on the
loan market, a pressure is felt on the gross market rate of interest,
which now would have to rise so as to take into account the positive
price premium. This process goes on as long as the expansionist
movement runs its course since the unceasing rise of the gross market
rate is unable to catch up with the originary interest augmented by
the positive price premium. This inevitably induces further economic
expansion, whose unfolding is similar to the one described in the
Theory: the vertical expansion of the structure of production Wrst favors
the prices of producers’ goods, thus bringing a tendency towards a fall
in the originary rate of interest.
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Let us now consider how Hayek describes the expansion stage.
As we have seen, the origin of the expansion lies in a negative
diVerence between the monetary rate and the equilibrium rate of
interest, which is due to the existence of the banking system. In other
words, as soon as credit is allowed for, supply and demand no longer
adjust automatically and prices determine a path towards economic
disequilibrium: “‘these prices may elicit movements which not only
do not lead to a new equilibrium position but which actually create
new disturbances of equilibrium.” (Hayek 1966 [1933], p. 94). In Prices
and Production Hayek describes how the initial disequilibrium
propagates within the economic system. As is well known, Hayek’s
theory of the upswing of a cycle is characterised by an increase in the
demand for capital emanating from producers’ awareness of new
investment opportunities and their access to bank credit. Newly raised
capital is then employed in the implementation of more roundabout
processes of production. However, since full-employment prevails,
the increase of capital goodsa can only be achieved through the
withdrawing productive resources from already existing shorter lines
of production. Therefore, the growth in the production of capital goods
is accompanied by a decline in the output of consumption goods. As-
suming that wages only rise with some delay, the prices of capital
goods increase faster than those of consumption goods, thus
intensifying the expansionary movement. There are, besides, additional
reinforcing factors linked to the ‘organization of credit’.
Let us consider Hayek’s conception of the banking system in more
detail. Hayek assumes a ‘mixed’ monetary system with both exogenous
and endogenous money. Commercial banks take their decisions on
the basis of their proWt expectations, which depend on the risk charac-
teristics of ????? would be borrowers, as well as on the behaviour of
competitors in the ?????????? system. Risk aversion of banks grows as
expansion goes on and is not independent of their pricing policy: at a
given risk level, the decision not to satisfy demand (by imposing too
high a loan rate) implies a greater opportunity cost for the banker.
This raises the winner’s curse problem: banks will still expand credit
in the upswing, even at the cost of depleting their resources, so as not
to loose clients and encounter additional risks. In the terms, there is
an ‘elastic’ deposit multiplier, which sustains the growing productive
activity.
To sum up, Mises and Hayek’s explanations of the upswing of the
cycle reveal similarities as regards to the movement of relative prices:
for both authors, the expansion is due to a disproportionate increase
of the prices of producers’ goods as compared to the ones of consumers’
goods. But they do not agree concerning the forces that sustain the
boom. While for Mises the lagged adjustement in the objective
exchange value of money – and hence, the lagged alignment of the
loan rate (or the systematic lagging of the gross market rate of interest
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in Mises’ latest version) – at Wrst reinforces the tendency towards higher
goods’ prices for Hayek it is the organization of credit that provides
the incentive for further expansion. This divergence already augurs
what their respective explanation of the reversal of the cycle will be.
4. 3. Reversal
In his Theory of Money and Credit, Mises describes the reversal in the
following terms: at a certain point, a counter-movement will set in,
i.e., the prices of consumption goods will rise while those of production
goods will fall. In other terms, the rate of interest on capital will rise,
thus approaching the natural rate (Mises 1981 [1924], p. 401). Mises’
explanation runs as follows. The implementation of more roundabout
processes of production implies the transfer of intermediate goods as
well as labor from their previous employment in shorter processes of
production, i.e., those producing consumption goods, which are now
activated at a reduced scale. Since no change in the consumption needs
of the wage earners is involved, this implies an increase in consumption
goods’ prices19. This tendency is now strengthened by the decrease in
the objective exchanged value of money that result from the increase
of the volume of Wduciary media issued by banks. This reinforcing
eVect on the rate of interest on capital is due to transitory movements
in the objective exchange value of money that are to be explained by
the fact that “variations in the exchange value of money do not appear
everywhere simultaneously and uniformly, but start from a particular
point and only spread out gradually throughout the market.” (ibid., p.
387). More precisely, Mises writes that it is the entrepreneurs who
generally beneWt from the increase of the issue of Wduciary media: if
the objective exchange value falls, the entrepreneur gains in the short
run since “he will be able to meet part of his expenses of production at
prices that do not correspond to the higher level, while, on the other
hand, he will be able to dispose of his product at a price that is in
accordance with the variation that has meanwhile occurred.” (ibid.).
This circumstance cannot fail to have an eVect on the interest rate on
loans: those entrepreneurs who beneWt from inXation, i.e., those that
are up the scale of goods, are prepared if necessary to pay a higher rate
of interest, and the competition of other would-be borrowers, who
are attracted by the same prospects of proWts, will accept the higher
rate. This induces the rate of interest on loans to rise. Thus, the
structure of relative prices, which is determined by the state of the
19. Insofar as they experience rising wages, workers would rather increase their demand for
consumption goods.
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capital market and which has been disturbed by the intervention of
the banks, will be approximately re-established, provided, as we shall
develop, that entrepreneurs use static expectations20.
As may be presumed from his description of the upswing, Mises
does not directly invoke the behaviour of banks in his explanation of
the reversal. On one hand, Mises makes it clear that any action from
the banks in order to oVset the automatic rise in the loan rate of interest
will be useless. He writes:
At Wrst, the banks may try to oppose these two tendencies [due to the insuYcient
supply of consumption goods and reinforced by the fall in the objective exchange
value of money] by continually reducing the interest rate on loans and forcing fresh
quantities of Wduciary media into circulation. But the more they thus increase the
stock of money in the broader sense, the more quickly does the value of money fall,
and the stronger is its countereVect on the rate of interest.
(ibid., p. 402)
This point is strengthened in Human Action, where Mises now takes
into account the possibility of hyperinXation. Under these
circumstances, things are even worse since, now expectations do not
only reXect previous inXation rate but anticipate the future state of
the market (Mises 1996 [1949], p. 545). This leads to an even more
drastic fall in the objective exchange value of money. In this case,
prices rise at a greater ???? than the growth of money and the loan rate
of interest can then rise without bounds21. As we have seen, the un-
ceasing rise of the gross market is unable to catch up with the origi-
nary interest augmented by the positive price premium. During peri-
ods of hyperinXation, this can even lead to the destruction of money.
As Mises notes:
The emergence of the price premium is not the product of an arithmetical operation
which could provide reliable knowledge and eliminate the uncertainty concerning
the future […] It comes into existence step by step as soon as Wrst a few and then
successively more and more actors become aware of the fact the market is faced
with cash-induces changes in the money relation and consequently with a trend
orientated in a deWnite direction. Only when people begin to buy or to sell in order
to take advantage of this trend, does the price premium come into existence.
It is necessary to realize that the price premium is the outgrowth of speculations
anticipating changes in the money relation. What induces it, in the case of the expec-
tation that an inXationary trend will keep on going, is already the Wrst sign of the
20. Mises believes that a precise re-establishment of the old price ratio between goods of the
Wrst order and goods of higher orders is not possible. On one hand, the intervention of banks
has brought about a redistribution of income and property. On the other hand, the automatic
recovery of the loan market involves some of the phenomena of a crisis (a certain degree of
irreversibility, social losses of value, etc.), which are the signs of the loss of some of the capital
invested in the excessively lengthened roundabout processes of production. According to Mis-
es, the remaining trace of all these disturbances will be a general increase of the objective
exchange value of money (Mises 1981 [1924], p. 402).
21. For more details, see Bellofiore (1998), p. 568, note 44.
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phenomenon which later, when it becomes general, is called ‘Xight into real values’
and Wnally produces the crack-up boom and the crash of the monetary system con-
cerned.
(ibid., p. 544)
In other words, although increasing, the gross market rate is still too
low for bringing about the required adjustments in the ‘money rela-
tion’. As Mises indicates: “the banks believe that they have done all
that is needed to stop ‘unsound’ speculation when they lend on more
onerous terms […] [But] they fail to see that in injecting more and
more Wduciary media into the market they are in fact kindling the
boom.” (ibid., p. 558).
Mises’ description of the reversal does not however exclude the pos-
sibility of some accumulation of capital. On one hand, given his empha-
sis on the indirect eVects of variations of the value of money in the dis-
tribution of real income and wealth, he cannot rule out the fact that
“such changes can under certain circumstances really alter the rate of
originary interest in a way which would be favourable to capital accu-
mulation.” (ibid., pp. 548-549). On the other hand, he points out that “it
would be a serious blunder to neglect the fact that inXation also gener-
ates forces toward capital consumption.” (ibid., p. 549). In particular, it
may well be the case that people are inclined to spend illusory gains.
Let us now turn to Hayek’s explanation of the end of the boom. Sim-
ilarly to Mises, Hayek indicates that a point will be reached at which
consumers will face an insuYcient supply of consumption goods. This
situation is aggravated by the fact that additional income has been gen-
erated during the upswing. This induces a counter-movement of rela-
tive prices: consumption good prices will rise while capital good prices
will fall, and the original price ratio will be re-established. Contrary to
Mises, Hayek argues that these are technical limits to the creation of
credit, so that it is the speciWc behaviour of banks that determines the
upper turning point of the cycle22. In other words, the Xexible deposit
multiplier described above appears to be bounded. Hayek explains
that, when the price of consumer goods begins to rise faster than the
price of capital goods, the ratio between cash payments and payments
by cheque is altered in favour of the former. Consequently, in the
course of a boom, the need for cash will increase along with prices
and induce a cash drain that will force banks to restrict credit supply.
Let us quote Hayek on this point:
Concerted action in this direction, which for competitive reasons is the only action
possible, will ensue only when the increased cash requirements of business compel
the banks to protect their cash balances by checking further credit expansion, or
when the Central Bank has preceded them. This, again, will only happen, as a rule,
22. See Hansen and Tout (1933), pp. 133-135, and Colonna (1994), pp. 41-44.
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when the banks have been induced by the growing drain on their cash to increase
their re-discount. Experience shows, moreover, that the relation between cheque-
payments and cash payments alters in favour of the latter as the boom proceeds, so
that an increased proportion of the cash is Wnally withdrawn from the banks.
(Hayek 1966 [1933], pp. 174-175)
Therefore, even in the assence reserve restrictions, credit expansion
must come to a halt before an accelerating rate of inXation under-
mines the monetary system. In Prices and Production, Hayek writes:
So long as the banks go on progressively increasing their loans it will, therefore, be
possible to continue the prolonged methods of production or perhaps even to ex-
tend them still further. But for obvious reasons the banks cannot continue indeWnite-
ly to extend credits; and even if they could, the other eVects of a rapid and continu-
ous rise of prices would, after a while, make it necessary to stop this process of inX-
ation.
(Hayek 1935 [1931], pp. 89-90)
This brings us to Hayek’s view on forced saving and capital accumula-
tion. In Prices and Production, when dealing with the case of forced – as
opposed to voluntary – saving, Hayek assumes given preferences. Banks
start the cycle. However, credit supply is an ?????????? to the amount of
???????????????? limited by savings. This implies that, for Hayek in con-
trast to Mises, credit expansion can never lead to capital accumula-
tion23. However, there remains a puzzle in Hayek’s treatment of the
banking system. When describing the case of voluntary savings, Hayek
indeed implicitely eliminates the assumption according to which bank-
ers are unable to distinguish between “those deposits which Wnd their
origin in credit and those which arose through cash payments” that
was at the root of the unsustainable cash drain in Monetary Theory and
the Trade Cycle (Hayek 1966 [1933], p. 163). As stressed by Trautwein,
this ‘dual’ treatment of the monetary system renders Hayek’s distinc-
tion between the cases of  voluntary savings and forced savings inconsis-
tent. There is however no reason to assume that in the case of forced
savings bankers are omniscient to the point that they know exactly
23. It should, however, be pointed out that, in his earlier writings, Hayek’s views on forced
saving were not all that diVerent from Mises’. For example, Hayek writes, in 1925:
The losses which arise from the revelation that the capital outlay made is not yet economi-
cally justiWed are the price of an undesirably rapid progress, a rate of progress which exceeds
that which people are ready to purchase for themselves by a corresponding voluntary sacri-
Wce of current enjoyments. – There can be no doubt at all that the development of the
capitalist economy over the last 100 years would not have been possible without the ‘forced
saving’ eVected by the extension of additional bank credit. Hence economic Xuctuations
must probably be regarded as a necessary accompaniment of the accelerated development
experienced by countries of the Western world in the last 150 years. Such Xuctuations, in
turn, could be entirely eliminated only if the tempo of this development was substantially
lessened …
(Hayek 1984 [1925], p. 21)
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what is the demand for funds emanating from entrepreneurs that is
consistent with consumers’ time preferences. More convincingly, an
increase in voluntary savings should also imply an expansion of bank
credit which would trigger exactly the kind of destabilising mecha-
nisms, as some the direct creation of credit would do. Moreover, the
question remains as to whether the case of forced saving would be less
stable than the one of voluntary saving unanswered24.
The aforementioned diVerences in Hayek and Mises’ explanations
of the successive stages of the cycle have revealed the speciWcity of
each author’s approach to business cycles: while Hayek’s  focuses
on the problem of coordination between saving and investment in
an indirect exchange economy, Mises emphasizes the time element
in the adjustment of markets when money interferes with real ex-
changes. Their divergent perspective is also exempliWed by their
stance at the issue of price expectations: on one hand, Hayek con-
centrates on the problem of  perception knowledge acquisition and
by individual economic agents; on the other hand, Mises tries to con-
vince the reader that the working of markets contains the seeds of
the forces lead the economy to equilibrium, even if this equilibrium
cannot be a priori deWned. These diVerences should however be an-
alyzed in the light of Mises and Hayek’s respective methodological
approaches. On this matter, there is some truth in saying that both
authors are concerned with the problem of knowledge. In Human
Action, Mises indeed emphasises the role of the time it takes for en-
trepreneurs to discover that they have been mistaken in allocating
productive resources. However, he implicitly assumes that they can
learn though the revision of their real balances’ expectations. By con-
trast, Hayek discards this possibility which, according to him, is in-
consistent with the subjectivist approach. From this viewpoint
Hayek’s case of forced saving provides a good ????????. In this case, it is
assumed that agents are unable to realize that their purchasing pow-
er has declined. But this raises the following question: how is it pos-
24. See Trautwein (1994), p. 77 and (1996), pp. 45-46.These inconsistencies in Hayek’s anal-
ysis were also taken up by SraVa. SraVa argues that Hayek’s case of ‘voluntary savings’ eVective-
ly describes a situation where there is no money at all (Sraffa 1995 [1932], p. 47). See also
Hansen and Tout (1933), pp. 139-140. Hayek’s answer to this critique is found in his 1934 article:
“Capital and Industrial Fluctuations”. He writes:
It is true that in Prices and Production I have not only not discussed in detail what rate of
credit expansion is requires to maintain a given rate of forced saving, but have simply as-
sumed that the rate – whatever it was – could not be permanently maintained for institu-
tional reasons, such as traditional banking policies or the operation of the gold standard. But
I think it can be shown without great diYculty that even if these obstacles to credit expan-
sion were absent, such a policy would, sooner or later, inevitably lead to a rapid and pro-
gressive rise in prices which, in addition to its undesirable eVects, would set movements
which would counteract, and Wnally more than oVset, the ‘forced saving’.
(Hayek 1934c, p. 156)
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sible for agents who can learn to make systematic errors? This conXict
in Hayek’s analysis of business cycles is also due to other inconsis-
tencies in his approach. For instance, Hayek strongly supports meth-
odological indivualism, however relies on the aggregative theory of
capital but developed by Böhm-Bawerk and does not, as pointed out
by SraVa, account for agents ‘heterogeneity’: “the essential contra-
diction is that Dr. Hayek must both assume that the ‘consumers’ are
the same individuals as the ‘entrepreneurs’, and that they are dis-
tinct.” (SraVa 1995 [1932], p. 201 fn.). This schizophrenic treatment of
economic agents and of the structure of production may thus ex-
plain why, in Profits, Interest and Investment, Hayek ultimately chose
to focus on the problem of the determination, by individual ???????????
of the investment period25.
5. Conclusion
The re-examination of Hayek and Mises’ business cycle analysis in
the light of their respective methodological background has allowed
us to clarify some of the controversial aspect of their analytical work.
The rather distinct perspectives taken up by Hayek and Mises in their
????????? approaches raise the problem of prejudgment in economic
discipline. To give one problem, Hayek is often presented as Mises’
student, while, in fact, he attended only one of Mises’ private semi-
nar lectures26. This does not mean, however, that Mises had no inX-
uence on Hayek. In a 1945 article, Hayek refers to Mises as the fore-
most exponent of the Austrian position on capital and interest see
Hayek, 1995b. In Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, he pays a true
tribute to Mises, writing that he “has succeeded in transforming the
Wicksellian theory into an explanation of the credit cycle which is
logically satisfactory” (Hayek 1966 [1933], p. 22). However, he had
never been convinced by Mises’ apriorist ‘Kantian’ approach of
knowledge. Hayek’s ????????? of knowledge was in fact more conge-
nial to the one of his cousin, Ludwig Wittgenstein, who taught us
that all formal knowledge tells us nothing about the world, and who
identiWed all knowledge that tells us something as contingent knowl-
edge.
25. See Longuet (1998), p. 96, and (1999).
26. We are grateful to Ransom (1996) for having clariWed this point. Hayek indeed tells an
amusing story of his Wrst meeting with Mises, which came during a job interview set up by
Hayek’s true teacher Friedrich Wieser, just after Hayek’s graduation from the University of
Vienna. As Hayek tells it, “I was sent to [Mises] by an introduction from Wieser, in which I was
described as a promising young economist. Mises, [after] reading this, [said], ‘Promising young
economist? I’ve never seen you at my lectures’”.
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